

Ambassador urged that the situation might be eased if Russia returned to the Security Council and Communist China was also seated, and Bajpai supported this suggestion. Ambassador Henderson replied that he could not see that anything would be gained by the presence of the two States in the Security Council so long as they did not alter their attitude on the Korean case, but he promised to forward the Indian views to Washington. (Tel. 21) - - - - - TAB 1

2. 6:52 a.m. -- Asked by G-3 for a recommendation as to US reaction from the political-military viewpoint in the event that Chinese Communist combat forces should enter the Korea fighting, CINCPAC said in a regular Department of the Army teleconference that in such event "sufficient power must be added to UN forces to insure fulfillment of currently assigned missions." "The first military steps," CINCPAC said, "should be to destroy the communication facilities into and through North Korea. The assistance of SAC would be required for this task. An announcement by the President that the U.S. would back up the UN decision with the Strategic Air Force if necessary might be a psychological deterrent to the Chinese people, including those in the military forces." (Extracts from DA TT 3462 and 3467) - - - - - TAB 2

- 1 -

TOP SECRET

4. 2:20 p.m. -- Minister Pinkerton reported from Beirut that the Lebanese Prime Minister had told him that he was not in accord with the Egyptian attitude on Korea. The Prime Minister said that Lebanon would use its influence with other Arab states. (Tel 3) - - - - - TAB 4

- 1 -

TOP SECRET

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to join other UN forces there. (Tel 8) - - - - - TAB 2

8. 4:14 p.m. -- Ambassador Luccio reported new and threatening advances by the North Koreans. He said that President Rhee had reached Pusan but desired to return to Taejon. An informal Cabinet had been held in Taejon but there was little evidence that government offices were being set up there. (Tel 10) - - - - - TAB 3

9. 5:21 p.m. -- Ambassador Link reported a discussion with Swedish Ambassador Solman in which the latter remarked on the change in the tenor

- 2 -

TOP SECRET

were entirely serious in their charges of U.S. aggression in connection

covering the possibility of contacts with Soviet vessels, the value of the blockade as such, international military liaison among the U.S., UK and other countries contributing naval forces, the possibility of UN supervision of the blockade, etc. -- In a memorandum by Mr. Johnson of NA, it was indicated that, besides the British, the Danish and Norwegian Embassies had informally asked for additional information and that similar inquiries from other countries were anticipated.

(Memo on Secretary's NSC briefing; memo by Johnson) - - - - - TAB 4

5. 11:51 a.m. -- Embassy Moscow telegraphed the text of a Soviet note branding the U.S. blockade of the Korean coast "a new act of aggression" and indicating that the Soviet Government would hold the U.S. "responsible for all the consequences of this act and for the entire damage which may be caused to the interests of the Soviet Union."

(Tel 50) - - - - - TAB 5

6. 12:30 p.m. -- The President, at the Secretary's regular meeting with him, approved the Department's draft of the proposed Security Council resolution for a unified command in Korea. (Memo by the

Secretary) - - - - - 2 - - - - - TAB 6

TOP SECRET

to the Government of India that the U. S. had not changed its position that the veto did not apply to the issue of Chinese representation, but that the U. S. considered it most undesirable for the question to be raised in the UN at this time. At its discretion, the Embassy might state that while the U. S. appreciated that India's motives were purely constructive, we could see no chance that East-West collaboration could be developed through an approach to this question now. (Tel 9 to New Delhi) - - - - - TAB 11

a request from the British Foreign Office to obtain Secretary Acheson's reaction. The Foreign Office said it would "not make any further move in Moscow without discussion with the United States Government." It observed that the British public "in the main believe that the Russians themselves recognize that they have overstepped the mark in Korea. They will therefore expect the most serious consideration to be given to any move which might lead to peace ..." (Extract from Foreign Office telegram to British Embassy, Washington with attached copies of Kelly reports of July 6 and June 29) - - - - - TAB 7

8. 3:44 p.m. -- Ambassador Kirk cabled that his first reaction to the Soviet request of the British for specific proposals was to regard the approach as genuine to the extent that it reflected the current Soviet view of Korean developments as unfavorable and their desire to localize the affair and to salvage as much prestige as possible. He said that Gromyko's request for specific proposals "cannot be let drop" and proposed a reply which would "make fully clear that a prerequisite to a peaceful solution is complete compliance by the North Koreans with

the

- 3 -

TOP SECRET

... violently violent propaganda of the Chinese Communists against the U. S. Mr. Perkins provided a summary of "the overwhelmingly favorable response", to our action in Korea among the Western European countries.

(Memos) - - - - - TAB 13

14. Mr. Barrett suggested to the Under Secretary that General MacArthur's semi-daily communiques should be changed to semi-daily "Reports to the UN Security Council". (Memo) - - - - - TAB 14

- 4 -

TOP SECRET

him again whether Mr. Matthews had seen it. He further referred

to the "unfortunate impression" caused by "the first 'silly' press report to the effect that Sweden would take no attitude in the matter."

(Memo by Green) - - - - - TAB 9

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10. 4:58 p.m. -- Ambassador Allen reported that Foreign Minister Kardelj had said Yugoslavia would seek an early appropriate occasion to "get off the fence" and make a declaration in support of the Senate Council resolution. Kardelj said recent troop movements in Bulgaria made the situation delicate but that an appropriate occasion might be found when the fighting returned to the 38th parallel if not before. Ambassador Allen told the Department that he had been strongly urging open Yugoslav support of our position in the UN, in the belief that the desirability of a clear Yugoslav position against aggression outweighed all the immediate advantages of a middle course. (Tel 23) TAB 10

11. 5:53 p.m. -- Ambassador Bay reported that he had communicated to Norwegian Foreign Minister Lange the Department's hope that Norway would introduce in the Security Council the next day the proposed resolution

- 4 -

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

U.S. action regarding Formosa was "an act of open aggression" and that by remaining silent the Security Council and the Secretary General had "foregone their functions and duties of upholding world peace." The resolution of June 27 regarding Korea was declared to be illegal and greatly damaging to the UN charter. (Tel 25) - - - - - TAB 12

Other Actions, July 6

(Listed here are entries for which no exact time is available.)

13. Brigadier General P. M. Hamilton of the U. S. Air Force showed Mr. Rusk a telegram from the Commanding General, Far East Air Forces to Headquarters Air Forces, Washington, asking for permission to conduct high level (30,000 feet) reconnaissance flights over Dairen, Port Arthur, Vladivostok, Karafuto, and the Kuril Islands. General Hamilton said that certain officers felt that FEAFF should simply go ahead and conduct such reconnaissance without raising any questions, while others thought that political clearance would be required. Mr. Rusk told General Hamilton that "such an operation at this time would raise political questions of gravest importance, that such flights would be

clearly

- 5 -

TOP SECRET

action in the Security Council did not mean opposition to the UN's action. (Tel 3) - - - - - TAB 2

3. 9:50 a.m. -- At the Under Secretary's meeting, in response to suggestions by Mr. Rusk, it was decided to have Mr. Matthews and Mr. Eare discuss the problem of how much pressure should be put on other countries to go along with the UN resolution on Korea. It was pointed out by Mr. Rusk that too great pressure might do more harm than good. Mr. Webb expressed the desire that the normal work of the Department not be interrupted by the Far Eastern situation; matters for decision should be brought to the Secretary, Under Secretary, and Mr. Matthews as required. (UN L-215; UN S-215) - - TAB 5

TOP SECRET